Introduction
Since 2001, the number of low-income countries (LICs)-where annual per capita incomes are at or below $1,025-has more than halved, to 31 in 2020 from 64 in 2001 (Figure 1 ). 1 During this period, their number rose to a peak of 66 in 2003 before falling to 31 in 2016. Since then, however, the overall decline has stalled, with three countries-the Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, and the Republic of Yemen-relapsing into LIC status amid armed conflict and terms of trade shocks, while another three countries (Cambodia, the Comoros, Zimbabwe) reached middle-income status. However, they are home to around 40 percent of the world's extreme poor. This share is expected to remain elevated amid continued fragility in many of these economies, while the poverty headcount is expected to continue to decline elsewhere. Today's LICs face severe challenges that threaten to hold back convergence of their per capita incomes with those in MICs. Today's LICs also face significantly larger spending needs than non-LIC EMDEs to meet the Sustainable Development Goals by the end of next decade, underscoring the need for sustained and robust growth (Gaspar et al. 2019 have per capita incomes that are even further below the middle-income threshold, more likely to be fragile, more often landlocked and clustered with other LICs, heavily reliant on agriculture, and face weaker prospects for long-term commodity demand. Third, since today's LICs account for 40 percent of the global extreme poor, challenging prospects for LIC growth will set back progress towards eliminating extreme poverty globally.
What has supported growth in LICs since 2001?
The 64 countries classified as LICs in 2001 experienced growth of 5.2 percent a year, on average, during 2001-18-considerably faster than the 3.6 percent growth in non-LIC EMDEs (Figure 3 ). For those LICs, this was a sharp improvement from their tepid growth of 1.6 percent annually during the 1990s.
Growth in the 64 2001 LICs was supported by several cyclical and structural factors. The 2001-11 commodity price boom lifted growth in the one-third of LICs that were-or became-industrial commodity exporters. In the nine LICs transitioning into market-oriented economies, the deep recessions of the 1990s were followed by cyclical rebounds. In five countries, armed conflicts eased in the 2000s after inflicting heavy human and economic losses during the 1990s. Debt relief for about half of the 2001 LICs helped put these economies on a more sustainable financial footing. Business climates and governance, especially the rule of law, improved significantly in more than half of the 2001 LICs.
Cyclical factors

Commodity price boom
Around three-quarters of the 2001 LICs benefited from the commodity price boom of 2000-11. During the commodity price boom, energy and industrial metals prices more than tripled and agricultural prices rose by around 150 percent. The boom, along with a decline in easily accessible mineral and gas deposits in advanced economies and more cost-effective transport through advances in bulk shipping fueled unprecedented investment in commodity exploration and production in the 2001 LICs (Lusty and Gunn 2015) . In 2008, commodity prices-particularly metals and oil prices-declined sharply with the onset of the global financial crisis but recovered to pre-crisis levels within about a year. However, by 2011, commodity prices began to slide again, and they fell by 30-60 percent to a low in 2016 before gradually and only partially recovering. 
Rebounds in transition economies
Nine of the 2001 LICs were, in the early 2000s, rebounding from the deep recessions into which their economies had plunged as they made the transition from centrally planned to market-based economies. By the time their economies had bottomed out in the mid-to late-1990s, their output had declined from its pre-recession levels by one-fifth in Uzbekistan, by more than a third in Kazakhstan, and by at least one-half in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Ukraine (Iradian 2007 ).
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As a result, per capita incomes had fallen below the low-income threshold.
However, despite the drop in output these economies continued to have a foundation of solid human and physical capital, with near-universal literacy rates, triple the average secondary enrollment ratio of the average 2001 LIC, and power-generating capacity similar to those of advanced economies. Governments in many of these countries were implementing growthenhancing structural reforms to accelerate the transition, including privatization of state-owned assets (for example, agricultural land reform in Azerbaijan); establishment of legal systems and property rights (the Kyrgyz Republic); the design of more efficient social safety nets (Armenia); strengthening of financial systems; greater openness to international trade, including through accession to the WTO (Georgia); and the improvement of business environments through substantive regulatory simplification (Moldova). These reforms helped boost productivity growth, including by promoting investment and exports (Loukoianova and Unigovskaya 2004) . Growth since 2001 was further supported by the commodity boom, as seven of these nine transition economies were also heavily reliant on commodity exports. 
Structural factors
Receding conflicts
Five of the LICs of 2001-all of which remain LICs today-emerged from severe conflicts in the 1990s and early 2000s (Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone). The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo is estimated to have cost 2.5 million lives when deaths related to conflict-induced disease and famine are included-equivalent to 3 percent of today's population (Lacina and Gleditsch 2004; Roberts et al. 2001) . Conflicts in Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone inflicted losses of human life equivalent to between 1 and 10 percent of their populations. While most of these economies are still considered fragile, conflict-related casualties in Africa have been on a declining trend since the 1990s. This has provided a more favorable setting for a growth rebound.
Debt relief
Thirty-five of the 2001 LICs (of which 24 remain LICs today) received debt relief during the early 2000s in the context of the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) and Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative. Between the year preceding debt relief and two years after it, 3 It is likely that the real GDP declines in these transition economies were overstated in the official data of the early 1990s, as the private sectors that were emerging at that time were typically not fully included in the statistical base during the early days of the transition (Iradian 2007 ). This reduction of debt burdens has helped put public finances on a sounder footing. While government deficits increased slightly (by about 1 percentage point of GDP), non-interest government expenditures rose by 5 percentage points of GDP, and combined health and education expenditures rose by one-fifth between the five years preceding debt relief and the five years following it (Figure 4 ). More sustainable public finances supported macroeconomic stability (Bayraktar and Fofack 2011; Marcelino and Hakobyan 2014) . Communications infrastructure has improved rapidly, helped in part by the spread of mobile phone networks (Aker and Mbiti 2010; World Bank 2016b) . The use of mobile phones has reduced information inefficiencies and transaction costs, benefitting particularly businesses and small-scale farmers in rural areas where distances from markets are large (Aker 2011) . Transaction costs could be lowered even further if broad-band internet network infrastructure was increased from its current low coverage of 1 percent of the population in the median LIC in 2016 (World Bank 2019b).
 Human capital. In the median 2001 LIC, secondary education net enrollment ratios rose from 24 to 47 percent of the school-age population between 2001 and 2016, supported by a roughly 30 percent increase in government spending on education. This, combined with improvements in average life expectancy in LICs-in part due to the improved prevention and more effective treatment of widely prevalent conditions such as malaria, HIV, and 9 AIDS-is creating the preconditions for an increasingly productive future workforce (Asiki et al. 2016; Barofski, Anekwe, and Chase 2015) .
Improved business climates and policy frameworks
The business climate has improved in the majority of the 2001 LICs between the 1990s and the 2010s. More specifically, the ease of starting a business, obtaining credit, and trading across borders has, on average, increased by 20-30 index points since 2006 (World Bank 2019c). Similarly, the Worldwide Governance Indicator scores for the rule of law have strengthened by about 20 percent, and there have been more moderate improvements in regulatory quality and political stability.
A growing number of LICs have strengthened their fiscal management through medium-term debt management strategies (World Bank 2019a). Some have strengthened their monetary policy frameworks and their buffers against shocks by adopting flexible exchange rate arrangements and using their policy instruments to target low domestic inflation; more than one-quarter of 2001 LICs had flexible exchange rate regimes in 2016, compared to fewer than one-fifth during 2001-10, on average.
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Improved policy frameworks and increased resilience to external shocks among the 2001 LICs have also been supported by increases in foreign exchange reserves from 8 percent of GDP in 2001 to 14 percent of GDP, on average, in 2017.
How have these factors affected LIC progression to MIC per capita incomes?
The 2001 LICs that became MICs benefited somewhat more from the factors discussed above than those that remained. On average, the 2001 LICs that became MICs had stronger policy frameworks, better governance and business environments, better-developed infrastructure, larger improvements in human capital, and more fiscal resources due to revenue-to-GDP ratios being significantly larger-by more than one-quarter. The 2001 LICs that became MICs also had a geographical advantage, as around one-third were landlocked compared to almost half of today's LICs. Furthermore, the 2001 LICs that were landlocked but became MICs had, on average, neighbors with per capita incomes that were 52 percent higher than current incomes among the neighbors of today's landlocked LICs. Exchange rate regimes are grouped according to the classification in Ilzetski, Reinhart and Rogoff (2017) , with the only exception that freely falling currencies are also regarded as flexible exchange rate arrangements. income in 2001 was more than double that of the countries that have remained LICs ( Table  1 Others reached MIC status after emerging from conflict (Côte d'Ivoire, Solomon Islands), or undertaking substantial public infrastructure investment (Bhutan).
LICs that achieved MIC per capita income levels
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The 2001 LICs that reached MIC status have steadily strengthened human capital development, the effectiveness of their governments, business climates, and the quality of their institutions in the years before progression and thereafter. In fact, these countries have consistently outperformed the median LIC on measures of these factors. In terms of per capita growth, the difference was more pronounced. 
New LICs: 2016-20
Countries that have reached MIC status often face structural challenges that constrain their prospects for continued strong growth, while those MICs with incomes near the LIC threshold risk falling back into the LIC bracket (EBRD 2019). Three of today's LICs fell back from middleincome levels since 2016: the Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, and Yemen. While the Syrian Arab Republic was classified as a LIC for the first time, Tajikistan, and Yemen relapsed into LIC status after some of the growth-enhancing factors discussed above had helped them move to middle-income status in earlier years.
In Tajikistan, robust growth was accompanied by a halving of its currency's value stemming from the 2014-16 commodity price slump and by rapid population growth; as a result, per capita incomes declined. Armed conflicts in the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen caused sharp declines in per capita incomes in both countries by severely disrupting activity, destroying physical infrastructure, and forcibly displacing more than one-half of the Syrian Arab Republic's population and almost a (World Bank 2017a, 2019d) . In both countries, oil production has fallen by 90 percent from pre-war levels, sharply constraining fiscal positions.
Prospects for further LIC progression
Prospects for most of today's LICs to progress to MIC levels in the near future are dim, as the factors that may hold back progression are more pervasive today than they were in the 2001 LICs (Figure 6 ).
 Weaker starting positions. The gaps between per capita incomes in today's LICs and in middle-income countries are larger than the corresponding gaps faced by the LICs of 2001 that subsequently became MICs. Comparing today's LICs with those that have become MICs, current public spending on health care relative to GDP in today's LICs is one-fifth lower than health care spending was in 2001 in the LICs that became MICs, measures of human capital development are lower by about one-tenth, the share of their populations with access to electricity is lower by one-third, and some measures of financial inclusion are lower by almost one-half.
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 Fragile or in conflict. Fifty-five percent of today's LICs are countries affected by fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV)-more than one-quarter higher than the share of countries in conflict among the 2001 LICs that became MICs.
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In these FCVs, weak governments and poor institutions are endemic. Government revenues in these countries are often lower than in other LICs, leaving them heavily dependent on foreign aid to finance critical government spending (IMF 2014) . Their economies are volatile and prone to collapses (World Bank 2017b). Since 1990, chronic FCVs-countries that have been FCVs for at least five yearshave faced annual output contractions of 3 percent or more at least once every decade.
 Clustered. More than half of the LICs that are not FCVs are landlocked, and their neighbors are other LICs or countries with per capita incomes just above middle-income thresholds. This geographical disadvantage-often exacerbated by high trade costs and behind-theborder non-tariff barriers-limits LICs' ability to unleash a growth burst by encouraging trade with large trading partner economies (Arvis et al. 2010; Arvis et al. 2013; Paudel and Cooray 2018) .
 Heavily reliant on agriculture. All but one (Yemen) of today's LICs is heavily dependent on the agriculture sector, which accounts for 30 percent of GDP on average compared with 9 percent of GDP in the average non-LIC EMDE. In 75 percent of today's LICs (considerably more than the 35 percent of 2001 LICs that became MICs) agriculture accounts for more than one-quarter of the economy. Climate change is presenting many of these agricultural sectors with severe challenges as mean temperatures continue to rise and 11
While mobile payment systems have improved financial inclusion in LICs, limited access to electricity, particularly in rural areas, severely constrains the charging of mobile phones (Max and Berman 2018; Riley and Kulathunga 2017, World Bank Group and China Development Bank 2017). 13 extreme weather events such as droughts, floods, and heatwaves occur more frequently and with greater intensity than in the 1980s and 1990s (World Bank 2017b; IPCC 2014; Chaney et al. 2014; Hoeppe 2014) . Recoveries from droughts appear to be taking longer, resulting in less time for livelihoods to be restored between droughts and thereby rendering countries even more vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change (Schwalm 2018) . Climaterelated destruction of crops and livelihoods could push many LIC populations further into poverty and this is aggravated by the limited capacity and resources of LICs to counter the adverse effects of climate change (Hallegatte et al. 2016) . Number of events  Weaker prospects for commodity demand. To transform recent resource discoveries in LICs into strong, sustained economic growth will require continued robust commodity demand growth, as well as strong governance and institutions to manage the associated revenue windfalls (Addison and Roe 2018) . 13 However, long-term prospects for commodity demand are weakening as growth in China-the largest source of commodity demand-slows and shifts towards less resource-intensive sectors (World Bank 2018a). 
Conclusion
Growth in low-income countries has benefited from a confluence of favorable cyclical and structural developments since 2001 that have allowed the number of LICs to more than halve over this period, as many countries achieved MIC per capita income levels. These factors have, at various points, included a commodity price boom, cyclical rebounds from the collapse of centrally planned regimes in the early-1990s, debt relief, fewer armed conflicts in Africa, trade integration, and improved business climates and policy frameworks. However, the cyclical factors that contributed to LICs reaching MIC status were either unique events (transition rebounds) or are 13
Mozambique's deep-water gas fields are estimated to hold more oil-equivalent reserves than are held by Angola or Nigeria-Sub-Saharan Africa's two largest oil producers-and production is set to start by 2022/23 (World Bank 2015a). Oil reserves in Uganda are estimated to be the fourth-largest in Sub-Saharan Africa, and production could start within the next three years (Alkadiri et al. 2014) . Large off-shore gas fields were recently discovered in Tanzania. LICs Poverty-weighted LICs Percent unlikely to be repeated over the foreseeable future (commodity boom), while structural factors that could support growth present lasting policy challenges that will require various policy reform efforts. Prospects for progression of today's LICs to middle-income status are, therefore, more challenging. Compared to the LICs of 2001 that became MICs, today's LICs have per capita incomes that are further below the middle-income threshold, are more likely to be fragile, are more often landlocked and clustered with other LICs, are heavily reliant on agriculture, and face weaker prospects for long-term commodity demand.
Today's LICs account for about 40 percent of the global poor and have average poverty rates in excess of 40 percent. Subdued prospects for lifting average per capita incomes in most of today's 31 LICs to middle-income levels pose a challenge for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and reducing global extreme poverty to 3 percent by 2030. To reach this goal, per capita GDP would need to grow by 6 percent per year up to 2030 and per capita incomes of the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution would need to grow at 8 percent per year (Figure 7 ; World Bank 2018b). Even during the global economic expansion that preceded the global financial crisis, per capita growth in today's LICs fell well below such rates (2.8 percent during 2001-07). Overall growth in LICs has been lower when growth is weighted according to the share of the world's extreme poor as opposed to output shares, implying that growth has been slower where it is needed most: in countries with the largest numbers of extreme poor.
Coordinated and multi-pronged policy efforts are needed to boost both domestic and external drivers of LICs' growth. Efforts to harness external drivers of growth include integrating LICs into global trade, diversifying exports, and encouraging foreign direct investment (Lee and Zhang 2019) . Domestically, this can help embody upgrades to skills and technologies, but needs to be supported by continued investment in human and physical capital, while maintaining sustainable government debt profiles. Further efforts to foster domestic sources of growth include developing stronger and deeper financial systems, ensuring greater financial inclusiveness, and strengthening governance and business climates to help the private sector to thrive while overcoming some of the challenges of informality (EBRD 2019; World Bank 2017c; 2018c; 2019a) . Enhanced competition policies, including the liberalization of unwarranted price controls, can encourage innovation, boost productivity and improve international competitiveness (World Bank 2016c; 2017d) . Growth could further be supported by measures aimed at ending conflicts and reducing social tensions, mobilizing domestic resources more effectively for sustainable government finances, and managing and adapting to growing climate risks.
